<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is a selective list of papers; a complete list of publications is attached to my CV.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Most of the papers on this list can also be obtained from the Stirling Research Repository (STORRE)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Papers that are unavailable online can be requested from me at r.a.duff@stir.ac.uk<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n 2025<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Principles of Criminalisation\u2019 (with T H\u00f6rnle), in Ambos et al (eds), Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice <\/em>vol. III, Cambridge University Press, 2025, 13-54<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018\u201cResponsive Penal Censure\u201d and its Implications\u2019, in Manikis and Watson (eds), Sentencing, Public Opinion, and Criminal Justice<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2025), 23-36<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018The Procedural Rights (and Responsibilities) of the Guilty\u2019, in Hirsch and Moser (eds), Rights in Criminal Law<\/em> (Hart, 2025), 257-71<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018The Reciprocity of Criminal Responsibility\u2019, in Crofts et al (eds), Routledge International Handbook on Criminal Responsibility<\/em> (Routledge, 2025), 37-46<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Communicative Theory\u2019, in Ryberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Punishment Theory and Philosophy<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2025), 90-112<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2024<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Reporting Crimes and Arresting Criminals: Citizens\u2019 Rights and Responsibilities under their Criminal Law\u2019 (with S E Marshall) (2024) 18 Criminal Law and Philosophy<\/em> 557-77<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Justice In-Between?\u2019 (2024) 28 Edinburgh Law Review<\/em> 221-8<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2023<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018De Minimis and the Structure of the Criminal Trial\u2019 (2023) 42 Law and Philosophy<\/em> 57-86<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Strict Liability and Strict Responsibility\u2019, in Kiener (ed), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility<\/em> (Routledge, 2023), 480-89<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018When Should We Plead Guilty?\u2019, in Roberts and Ryberg (eds.), Sentencing the Self-Convicted<\/em> (Hart Publishing, 2023) 15-33<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Risk, Responsibility, and Pre-Trial Detention\u2019, in Broadhead and Placani (eds), Risk and Responsibility in Context<\/em> (Routledge, 2023), 73-93<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2022<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Crimes of Endangerment\u2019 (with T H\u00f6rnle), in Ambos et al (eds) Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice <\/em>vol. II, Cambridge University Press, 2022, 132-65<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Beccaria\u2019s Contractarian Criminal Law\u2019 (with S E Marshall), in duBois Pedain and Eldar (eds), Re-Reading Beccaria<\/em> (Hart Publishing, 2022), 53-71<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018State Responsibility: An Outsider\u2019s View\u2019, in Besson (ed.), Theories of International Responsibility Law<\/em> (Cambridge University Press, 2022), 70-92<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Purgative Punishment and the Importance of Perspective\u2019, in Kurki and McBride (eds), Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2022), 321-42<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2021<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Proportionality and the Criminal Law\u2019, in Billis et al (eds), Proportionality in Crime Control and Criminal Justice<\/em> (Hart Publishing, 2021), 29-47<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Searching for Criminal Responsibility: What are We Looking for?\u2019, in Solanke (ed.), On Crime, Society and Responsibility in the work of Nicola Lacey<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2021), 33-52<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Character, Propensities, and the (Mis)use of Statistics in Criminal Trials\u2019 (with S E Marshall), in Hoskins and Ronson (eds), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials<\/em> (Routledge, 2021), 77-91<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2020<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Defending the Realm of Criminal Law\u2019 (2020) 14 Criminal Law and Philosophy<\/em> 465-500<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Criminal Law and the Constitution of Civil Order\u2019 (2020) 70 University of Toronto Law Journal<\/em> (Supp) 4-26<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Legal Obligation and the Criminal Law\u2019, in Bertea (ed.), Contemporary Perspectives on Legal Obligation<\/em> (Routledge, 2020), 116-32<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Offenders as Citizens\u2019, in Focquaert et al (eds), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Punishment<\/em> (Routledge, 2020), 26-36<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Responsible Agency in the Criminal Process\u2019, in McCay and Sevel (eds), Free Will and the Law: New Perspectives<\/em> (Routledge, 2020) 126-43<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2019<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Cliff-top Predicaments and Morally Blemished Lives\u2019 (2019) 19 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies<\/em> 125-40<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Two Models of Criminal Fault\u2019 (2019) 13 Criminal Law and Philosophy<\/em> 643-65<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Crimes, Public Wrongs, and Civil Order\u2019 (with S E Marshall) (2019) 13 Criminal Law and Philosophy<\/em> 27-48<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Moral and Criminal Responsibility: Answering and Refusing to Answer\u2019 (2019) 5 Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility<\/em> 165-90<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018\u201cThank God I Failed\u201d\u2019, in Hurd (ed.), Moral Puzzles and Legal Perplexities<\/em> (Cambridge University Press, 2019) 60-75<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2018<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Criminal Law and Criminalization: A Response to Critics\u2019 (2018) 18 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies<\/em> 62-87<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Legal Reasoning, Good Citizens, and the Criminal Law\u2019 (2018) 9 Jurisprudence<\/em> 120-31<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Responsibility and Reciprocity\u2019 (2018) 21 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice<\/em> 775-87<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Criminalizing Hate\u2019 (with S E Marshall), in Brudholm and Johansen (eds.), Hate, Politics, Law<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2018) 115-49<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2017<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Discretion and Accountability in a Democratic Criminal Law\u2019, in Langer and Sklansky (eds), Prosecutors and Democracy<\/em> (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 9-39<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2016<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Civic Punishment\u2019 (with S E Marshall), in Dzur et al (eds), Democratic Theory and Mass Incarceration<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2016) 33-59<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Legal Moralism and Public Wrongs\u2019, in Ferzan and Morse (eds), Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Truths<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2016), 95-109<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2015<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018\u201cAbstract Endangerment\u201d, Two Harm Principles, and Two Routes to Criminalisation\u2019 (with S E Marshall) (2015) 3 Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice<\/em> 131-161<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Criminal Responsibility and the Emotions: If Fear and Anger Can Exculpate, Why Not Compassion?\u2019 (2015) 58 Inquiry<\/em> 189-220<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2014<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Introduction: Towards a Theory of Criminalization?\u2019 (with L Farmer, S Marshall, M Renzo, V Tadros), in Farmer et al (eds), Criminalization: The Political Morality of the Criminal Law<\/em>, Oxford University Press, 2014, 1-53<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Torts, Crimes and Vindication: Whose Wrong is it?\u2019, in Dyson (ed.), Unravelling Tort and Crime<\/em> (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 146-73<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Repairing Harms and Answering for Wrongs\u2019, in Oberdiek (ed.), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Torts<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2014), 212-30<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2013<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Who Must Presume Whom to be Innocent of What?\u2019 (2013) 42 Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy<\/em> 170-92<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Relational Reasons and the Criminal Law\u2019 (2013) 2 Oxford Studies in Legal Philosophy<\/em> 175-208<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Intention Revisited\u2019, in Baker and Horder (eds), The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law: The Legacy of Glanville Williams <\/em>(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 148-77<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Pre-Trial Detention and the Presumption of Innocence\u2019, in Ashworth et al (eds), Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2013) 115-32<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Virtue, Vice and the Criminal Law\u2019, in Lai and Amaya (eds), Law, Virtue and Justice<\/em> (Hart Publishing, 2013) 195-214<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2012<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Guiding Commitments and Criminal Liability for Attempts\u2019 (2012) 6 Criminal Law and Philosophy<\/em> 411-427<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Political Retributivism and Legal Moralism\u2019 (2012) 1 Virginia Journal of Criminal Law <\/em>179-204<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Risks, Culpability, Criminal Liability\u2019, in Sullivan and Dennis (eds), Seeking Security<\/em> (Hart Publishing, 2012) 121-42<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Presuming Innocence\u2019, in Zedner and Roberts (eds), Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2012) 51-66<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Responsibility, Restoration and Retribution\u2019, in Tonry (ed.), Retributivism Has a Past: Has it a Future?<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2012) 63-85<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2011<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Responsibility, Citizenship and Criminal Law\u2019, in Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law<\/em> (above) 125-48<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Retrieving Retributivism\u2019, in White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2011) 3-24<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Mercy\u2019, in Deigh and Dolinko (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal Law<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2011) 467-92<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2010<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Perversions and Subversions of Criminal Law\u2019, in Farmer et al (eds), The Boundaries of the Criminal Law<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2010), 88-112<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018A Criminal Law for Citizens\u2019 (2010) 14(3) Theoretical Criminology<\/em> 293-309<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Blame, Moral Standing and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Trial\u2019, (2010) 23 Ratio<\/em> 123-40<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018What Kind of Responsibility Must Criminal Law Presuppose?\u2019, in Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2010), 178-99<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018In Response\u2019, in Cruft, Kramer, Reiff (eds), Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff <\/em>(Oxford University Press, 2010), 351-79<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Psychopathy and Answerability\u2019, in Malatesti and McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2010) 198-212<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law\u2019, in Besson and Tasioulas (eds), Philosophy of International Law<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2010) 589-604<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2009<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Philosophy and \u201cthe Life of the Law\u201d\u2019 (2009) 27 Journal of Applied Philosophy<\/em> 245-58<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Can We Punish the Perpetrators of Atrocities?\u2019, in Brudholm and Cushman (eds), The Religious in Responses to Mass Atrocities<\/em> (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 79-104<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2008<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Whose Luck is it Anyway?\u2019, in Cunningham (ed.), Criminal Liability for Non-Aggressive Death<\/em> (Ashgate, 2008), 61-78<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2007<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018The Intrusion of Mercy\u2019 (2007) 4 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 361-87<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2006<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018How Offensive Can You Get?\u2019 (with S E Marshall), in von Hirsch and Simester (eds.), Incivilities:<\/em> Regulating Offensive Behaviour<\/em> (Hart Publishing, 2006) 57-90<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2005<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Criminalizing Endangerment\u2019, in Defining Crimes<\/em> (ed. with S P Green), Oxford University Press, 2005, 43-64<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Theorizing Criminal Law\u2019 (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies<\/em> 353-67<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2004<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018Action, the Act Requirement and Criminal Liability\u2019, in Hyman and Steward (eds.), Agency and Action<\/em> (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 69-103<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2003<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018\u201cI Might be Guilty, but You Can\u2019t Try Me\u201d: Estoppel and Other Bars to Trial\u2019 (2003) 1 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 245-259.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence\u2019 (2003) 34 Metaphilosophy 214-224<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n